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DAVID SKEEL, JR*

CRIMINALIZATION OF CORPORATE LAW
The Impact of Criminal Sanctions on Corporate
Misconduct

I FEEL I HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO GIVE SOMETHING LIKE A resounding endorsement
of corporate criminal liability just so we will have an alternative view. I am not
going to give an entirely resounding endorsement, but I want to defend it a little bit
to try to bring out the other side.
I am sympathetic to the view that we need corporate criminal liability in order to
give corporate managers adequate incentives to police misbehavior.' I think one
can quibble about whether the corporation's liability should be civil or criminal,
but the incentive effect strikes me as a plausible justification for corporate civil
liability at the least, and arguably for criminal liability as well. It is true, of course,
as has been noted a number of times, that corporations are not things,2 but corporations do have identifiable cultures? Enron certainly had an identifiable culture,
and so to say "there is no there there," to quote Gertrude Stein, is, I think, a little
bit of an overstatement.
I want to make four additional points and they are going to go in different
directions, but let me just throw them out. First, we have not said much about why
corporate employees commit crimes. It seems to me that this might be worth exploring. One pressure that encourages corporate employees to misbehave in many
corporations is the system of compensation.' So the debates about the causes of the
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corporate scandals of the 1990s, such as the effect of stock options, are, I think,
quite relevant to our discussion of corporate criminal liability.6 To the extent a

corporate employee's compensation is heavily based on short-run profits or shortrun performance measures of some sort, there is an incentive to cut corners. 7 If we
are concerned about this, it seems to me that it is worth considering whether corporate criminal liability is a possible antidote, or antidote to some kinds of corporate misbehavior, and if not, why not.
The second of the four points I want to make is related to something we have
already discussed a lot this morning. It seems to me that it is important to reward
cooperation by the corporation with an investigation if our goal is to encourage
corporate employees to behave. If a company puts a compliance program in place
that dredges up evidence of misbehavior, for instance, its managers will have a
disincentive to disclose that misbehavior unless they are somehow rewarded for the
disclosure!
Third, we have talked a lot already about the fact that cooperation with the
government ends up putting a lot of power in the prosecutor's hands. So what do
we do about all of this? It seems to me that an obvious partial solution, which has
been hinted at a little bit already, is to think in terms of the scope of liability. To the
extent we have corporate criminal liability, ideally it would be extremely narrow.
The problem with advocating narrow, tailored liability-and this is where I am
going to jump to the other side of the fence and criticize corporate criminal liability-is that all of the political incentives point in exactly the opposite direction.'
Think about what happens when there is a new form of high profile misbehavior.
The first thing that happens is people talk about enacting a new criminal law to
punish that behavior. If you are a lawmaker, how do you think about the proposed
law? You do not think "Well, it is probably not a good idea, because in ten years we
will have second thoughts about this. I am going to vote no on it." You are going to
vote yes, because if you vote no you are going to be an ex-lawmaker pretty quickly.
So there is a huge incentive to criminalize things ° and there is really no punishment to lawmakers who vote yes, even if the new law is a terrible idea. If it turns
out ten years from now that the sweeping catchall anti-fraud provision in Sarbanes-
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Oxley" is a disaster, no lawmaker is going to get punished for that. There might be
a prosecutor who gets punished for invoking it in a dubious case, but lawmakers
will not get punished. There is thus an obvious tension between the kind of corporate liability that makes sense-that is, narrowly tailored liability-and the political
pressures that lawmakers face to criminalize everything in sight.
Finally, an almost entirely unrelated point, just to throw out another aspect of
the question of sanctions, I think it is worth thinking about whether "shaming
sanctions"" are appropriate or not. Most of what other folks have said on this panel
would suggest no, but I actually think they are useful in some contexts. 3 I think
requiring a corporate polluter to publish something in the local newspaper of record apologizing for its actions, for instance, can serve some useful functions.
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